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This paper investigates the association between greater income inequality, de-facto fis-
cal space, and sovereign spreads. Using data from 50 countries in 2007, in 2009 and in
2011, we find that higher income inequality is associated with a lower tax base, lower
de-facto fiscal space, and higher sovereign spreads. The economic magnitude of these
effects is rather large: an increase in the Gini coefficient of inequality by 1 (in a scale of
0---100), is associated in 2011 with a lower tax base of 2 percent of the GDP, and with
a higher sovereign spread of 45 basis points.
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1. Introduction
The growing public debt in OECD and developing countries put to the fore
the need to rebalance fiscal deficits. This can be done by either raising taxes,
or cutting expenditure. The recent experience of the US and other countries
vividly illustrate the challenges with raising taxes, suggesting the presence
of structural factors accounting for resistance to tax reforms. A possible ob-
stacle may be polarized distribution of income. If all agents are identical,
equal burden sharing would be the norm. Greater income inequality may
put a drag into efforts to broaden the tax base. A possible mechanism ex-
plaining the resistance was modeled by Be´nabou (2000), showing conditions
under which greater inequality would result in less government spending
on redistribution. As broader tax base is a necessary condition for greater
redistribution, opponents of redistribution opt to oppose it.
In this paper, we investigate the association between income inequalities
and the tax base across countries in the 2000s, and link it to the pricing of
sovereign debt. We find strong negative association between the two, and
that higher inequality is associated with lower tax base, lower de facto fiscal
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space, and with a higher sovereign spreads.1 Our de facto fiscal space follows
Aizenman and Jinjarak (2011), defined as the public debt relative to the de
facto tax base, where the latter measures the realized tax collection, averaged
across several years to smooth for business cycle fluctuations. Thus, the de
facto fiscal space is inversely related to the tax-years it would take to repay
the public debt. In practice, the average tax revenue provides a good statistics
on the de facto taxing capacity, being the outcome of the tax code and its
effective enforcement. While the public debt/GDP ratio may increase rapidly
at times of peril [see Ireland in the recent crisis, more than doubling its public
debt/GDP in one year], the de facto taxing capacity changes slowly at times of
peril, as parties tend to be locked in a war of attrition, attempting to minimize
their adjustment burden [Alesina and Drazen (1991)]. Consequently, the
ratio of the outstanding public debt to the de facto tax base, or the tax-years
needed to repay the public debt, provide information about the relative fiscal
tightness of countries. For a given similar unanticipated adverse fiscal shock,
a country with lower public debt/average tax revenue may have more room
to adjust by reallocating its priorities of using the relatively high tax base.
2. Estimation
We consider a linear equation relating sovereign risk to de facto fiscal space:
SovRiskit = b0 + b1FiscalSpaceit−1 + uit + eit ; (1)
where SovRiskit is the market price of sovereign risk of country i at year t,
FiscalSpaceit−1 is the fiscal space variable (lagged one period), and uit repre-
sents other factors that affect sovereign risk, such as trade openness, growth,
income level, inflation, and foreign reserves, and eit is the error term. As our
fiscal space variable, defined as public debt/[average tax revenue], is made
of the public debt/GDP in the numerator and the average tax revenue/GDP
in the denominator, the interactions between these two variables and other
macroeconomic factors imply that the regressor, FiscalSpaceit, is likely to
be correlated with the error term. Including income inequality is our gist of
1 Heller (2005) defined fiscal space “as room in a government’s budget that allows it to pro-
vide resources for a desired purpose without jeopardising the sustainability of its finan-
cial position or the stability of the economy.” Yet, measuring ‘fiscal space’ tightly remains
a challenge. Ghosh et al. (2011) uses a stochastic ability-to-pay model of sovereign de-
fault in which risk-neutral investors lend to a government that displays “fiscal fatigue,”
because its ability to increase primary balances cannot keep pace with the rising debt.
Using data for 23 advanced economies over 1970–2007, they find evidence of a fiscal reac-
tion function with these features, and use it to compute “fiscal space,” defined as the dif-
ference between projected debt ratios and debt limits. This approach provides operative
measures of fiscal space, yet its precision is limited by the inability to predict tightly fu-
ture growth rates and real interest rates.
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solution to this potential endogeneity of fiscal space as the main variable of
interest. We formally address the issue in the as follows.
2.1. Income Equality and Fiscal Space
It is plausible that an above-average inequality (i.e., a high Gini coefficient)
could impair tax collection and thus reduce the fiscal space at a given public
debt level. This conjecture is in line with Be´nabou (2000), showing in a model
of endogenous redistribution that more inequality may result in less govern-
ment spending on redistribution because the consensus for ex ante efficient
redistributive policies breaks down. This result was confirmed by the find-
ings that more unequal societies do spend less on redistribution [de Mello
and Tiongson (2006)]. Our goal is to test directly the association of greater
income inequality and the tax base, and to evaluate the ultimate association
of income inequality and sovereign risk.
As long as the income inequality does not have a direct effect on the
sovereign risk, the correlation between the Gini coefficient and uit would
be small. Thus, the Gini coefficient is a potential instrumental variable that
is both relevant and exogenous. Figures 1.a and 1.b are scatterplots of the
data for 2007 and 2011, respectively, of the tax base – income inequality
relationship.2 A look at figures 1.a and 1.b reveals that developed countries
are clustered mainly to the left, while emerging markets are clustered to the
right. This suggests other explanations, i.e. the association between the cor-
ruption level and the tax base. Indeed, figures 1.c and 1.d support the negative
relationship between the tax base and the Corruption Index. Therefore, we
also include the Corruption index as an additional right hand variable:3
FiscalSpaceit = a0 + a1Giniit−1 + a2Gini2it−1 + a3Corruptionit−1
(2)
+ eit .
Note that because sovereign risk, fiscal space, and income inequality are
likely driven by political economy considerations, we use the lagged Gini
coefficient so that it affects the sovereign risk only indirectly through the
fiscal space variable(s). We base our econometric analysis on the 50 countries
2 We use the World Bank’s “All The GINIS” 2010 data, compiled from 5 primary sources
(LIS, SEDLAC, WYD, ECA, and WIID), covering the desirable years for fifty countries.
See Milanovic, Lindert, and Williamson (2010), and Haughton and Khandker (2009). We
refrained from using Atkinson and the Theil’s indexes due to their limited coverage of
countries and years.
3 We did not include GDP per capita as it is potentially endogenous with respect to the de-
pendent variable. Note that there could also be other explanations, such as an increas-
ingly large informal economy causing more inequality due to falling tax revenues and
weakened social safety nets; and increasing inequality causing more informal activity as
social solidarity and trust decline (see Rosser et al. 2000).
Joshua Aizenman and Yothin Jinjarak4
that have comprehensive records of the key variables; Gini coefficient, tax
base, fiscal space, and market pricing of sovereign risk, up to year 2011. Using
data for the 50 countries in 2007 and in 2011, table 1 reports the quadratic
regression of fiscal space variable and its components on the Gini coefficient
and the Corruption level.
Table 1
Income Inequality and Fiscal Space
Average tax revenue Public debt Public debt
%GDP %GDP [average tax revenue]
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
year 2007 2011 2007 2011 2007 2011
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
lagged
Ginii
−1.71 (0.98) ∗ −2.27 (0.95) ∗∗ −3.18 (5.82) −4.60 (5.36) −0.20 (0.29) −0.13 (0.23)
lagged
Gini2i
0.02 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) ∗ 0.04 (0.07) 0.05 (0.06) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
lagged −5.07 (1.07) ∗∗∗ −3.41 (1.11) ∗∗∗ −2.08 (6.60) −4.87 (6.17) 0.49 (0.35) 0.18 (0.26)
Corruptioni
constant 66.43 (19.4) ∗∗∗ 79.36 (19.02) ∗∗∗ 104.97 (122.50) 151.82 (112.66) 5.13 (5.99) 4.30 (4.70)
R2 0.65 0.55 0.02 0.07 0.19 0.05
countries 50 50 50 50 50 50
Fiscal Balance Fiscal Balance
%GDP [average tax revenue]
(vii) (viii) (ix)
year 2007 2011 2007 2011
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
lagged
Ginii
0.62 (0.56) 0.37 (0.81) 0.03 (0.02) 0.01 (0.03)
lagged
Gini2i
−0.01 (0.01) −0.00 (0.01) −0.00 (0.00) −0.00 (0.00)
lagged −2.35 (1.01) ∗∗ −0.71 (1.41) −0.10 (0.04) ∗∗ −0.05 (0.05)
Corruptioni
constant −14.66 (11.49) −13.91 (16.48) −0.65 (0.50) −0.44 (0.65)
R2 0.17 0.04 0.17 0.04
countries 50 50 50 50
Note: This table reports a cross-country OLS estimation. The dependent variable is the fiscal space variable
(FiscalSpacei) and its component of country i. The lagged Gini coefficient takes a value of 0–100 (where
100 = perfect inequality). The Corruption index ranges from −2.5 (low) to +2.5. Heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors are in parentheses, with ∗∗∗ (∗∗ ,∗) denoting statistical significance at 1 (5,10) level.
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Columns (i) and (ii) show that higher inequality is associated with lower
tax base over the sample period; and that the inequality effect has increased
from 2007 to 2011. The quadratic term, Gini2i , suggests that a negative asso-
ciation between inequality and tax collection flattens out when inequality is
high. The relationship between tax base and corruption is negative and sta-
tistically significant. The R2 of these regressions are 55–65%, so the variation
in inequality and corruption explains a significant variance of tax collection
across countries. On the other hand, the associations between Gini coefficient
and the public debt/GDP variable (columns (iii) and (iv)), as well as the Gini
and the public debt/[average tax revenue/GDP] (columns (v) and (vi)), as
well as the fiscal balance to GDP (columns vii and viii) and the fiscal balance
to tax base (columns ix and x) are insignificant. So the influence of inequality
on fiscal space operates through the tax base denominator. Based on the
regression estimates of table 1 columns (i) and (ii), a one standard deviation
increase of Gini (10.4 in 2007 and in 2011) is associated with a lower average
tax base by −15.6 %GDP in 2007 [10.4∗(−1.71) + 108.16∗(0.02) = −15.6];
and by −21.4 %GDP in 2011. This back-of-the-envelope calculation is con-
sistent with the patterns observed in the plots of figure 1.
Figure 1
Tax Base, Inequality, and Corruption in 50 Countries, 2007–11
1a. Correlation =−.64 1b. Correlation =−.61
1c. Correlation = −.72 1d. Correlation =−.63
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2.2. Application to the Sovereign Risk Equation
We estimate the association between sovereign risk and fiscal space with the
two-stage least square estimation, summarized as
SovRiskit = b0 + b1TaxBaseit−1 + Xit ′b + ci + εit (3)
TaxBaseit = a0 + a1Giniit−1 + a2Gini2it−1 + a3Corruptionit−1
(4)
+ Xit ′a + ci + eit ;
where TaxBaseit is a single endogenous regressor, a and b are two sets of
unknown regression coefficients, with Xit a set of exogenous variables, ci are
the unobserved characteristics that vary across countries but do not change
overtime, and Giniit and Gini2it are the two instruments in the reduced form of
TaxBaseit. We can now undertake a thorough evaluation of inequality effect
on both the fiscal space and the sovereign risk.
To deal with the presence of ci, we ask first: why do some countries have
higher sovereign risk than others? One reason might be variation in macroe-
conomic factors across countries, including public debt/GDP, [exports +
imports]/GDP, real GDP growth, consumer price inflation, foreign reserves/
external debt ratio, volatility of GDP (three-year standard deviation), and
time-specific effects – we add these variables to Xit so they are not part of
the error term. Another reason is that there are historical factors influenc-
ing the sovereign risk. For example, fragile states have higher sovereign risk
than other states. This could possibly be related to inequality and corruption,
suggesting that an omitted factor in sovereign risk – whether the country is
inherently fragile – could be correlated with the Gini coefficient and the
corruption level.
To eliminate the influence of unobserved variables that vary across coun-
tries but do not change over time, such as the state fragility and historical
conditions, we make use of years 2007, 2009 and 2011 data.4 Table 2 provides
results from three empirical specifications. All regressions have the same
regressors, and all coefficients are estimated using two-stage least squares,
with the functional form of the dependent variable, CDS prices, in log term,
and various plausible assumptions on the unobserved characteristics ci. The
causal variable of interest, TaxBase, is instrumented by Gini, Gini2, and
corruption level.
4 We chose this particular time period due to the dramatic changes taking place in several
European countries that may confound the estimation. There is evidence that the pric-
ing behavior of the credit markets of the Euro Area sovereign bonds was different before
and after 2007. Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2010) find that while prior to July 2007 the
borrowing costs of the Euro Area countries were converging and macroeconomic funda-
mentals did not play an important role, since August 2007, the markets began to price in
country-specific macro fundamentals.
Income Inequality, Tax Base and Sovereign Spreads 7
Ta
b
le
2
E
st
im
at
es
of
So
ve
re
ig
n
R
is
k
E
qu
at
io
n
U
si
ng
P
an
el
D
at
a
fo
r
50
C
ou
nt
ri
es
Po
ol
ed
Tw
o-
St
ag
e
L
ea
st
Sq
ua
re
s
(2
sl
s)
L
ag
ge
d-
D
ep
en
de
nt
2s
ls
Fi
rs
t-
D
if
fe
re
nc
ed
2s
ls
(i
)
(i
i)
(i
ii)
(i
v)
(v
)
(v
i)
20
07
,
20
09
,
20
11
20
07
20
09
20
11
20
07
,
20
09
,
20
11
20
07
v.
20
11
ln
(C
D
S
pr
ic
es
)
ln
(C
D
S
pr
ic
es
)
ln
(C
D
S
pr
ic
es
)
ln
(C
D
S
pr
ic
es
)
ln
(C
D
S
pr
ic
es
)
ln
(C
D
S
pr
ic
es
)
b
s.e
.a
b
s.e
.a
b
s.e
.a
b
s.e
.a
b
s.e
.b
b
s.e
.c
Ta
xB
as
e
−0
.0
62
(0
.0
13
)
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
97
(0
.0
15
)
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
46
(0
.0
16
)
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
46
(0
.0
17
)
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
05
(0
.0
12
)
0.
81
4
(0
.8
65
)
P
ub
lic
D
eb
t
0.
00
3
(0
.0
03
)
−0
.0
02
(0
.0
05
)
0.
00
2
(0
.0
03
)
0.
00
7
(0
.0
04
)
∗
0.
00
3
(0
.0
01
)
∗∗
0.
06
2
(0
.0
24
)
∗∗
∗
Tr
ad
e
O
pe
nn
es
s
−0
.0
44
(0
.1
91
)
−0
.2
09
(0
.2
26
)
−0
.0
84
(0
.2
07
)
0.
11
7
(0
.2
05
)
0.
14
8
(0
.1
09
)
−0
.8
01
(1
.9
74
)
R
ea
l
G
D
P
G
ro
w
th
−0
.0
63
(0
.0
22
)
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
90
(0
.0
60
)
−0
.0
37
(0
.0
21
)
∗
−0
.1
11
(0
.0
35
)
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
31
(0
.0
16
)
∗∗
0.
05
6
(0
.0
55
)
In
fla
ti
on
0.
09
1
(0
.0
27
)
∗∗
∗
0.
15
8
(0
.0
40
)
∗∗
∗
0.
07
8
(0
.0
21
)
∗∗
∗
0.
07
3
(0
.0
41
)
∗
0.
04
6
(0
.0
12
)
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
67
(0
.1
64
)
R
es
er
ve
s/
E
xt
.
D
eb
t
−0
.0
02
(0
.0
01
)
∗∗
−0
.0
02
(0
.0
02
)
−0
.0
02
(0
.0
01
)
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
00
(0
.0
01
)
−0
.0
00
(0
.0
01
)
−0
.0
04
(0
.0
08
)
V
ol
at
ili
ty
of
R
ea
l
G
D
P
0.
17
8
(0
.1
05
)
∗
0.
02
8
(0
.1
45
)
0.
22
0
(0
.1
67
)
0.
19
7
(0
.1
30
)
0.
07
9
(0
.0
64
)
−0
.1
35
(0
.3
43
)
20
09
du
m
m
y
va
ri
ab
le
0.
70
1
(0
.1
37
)
∗∗
∗
0.
46
3
(0
.1
21
)
∗∗
∗
20
11
du
m
m
y
va
ri
ab
le
1.
48
5
(0
.2
04
)
∗∗
∗
0.
59
4
(0
.1
83
)
∗∗
∗
−0
.9
47
(0
.7
61
)
L
ag
ge
d
de
pe
nd
en
t
0.
58
9
(0
.0
79
)
∗∗
∗
co
ns
ta
nt
5.
47
3
(0
.5
48
)
∗∗
∗
6.
71
4
(0
.9
51
)
∗∗
∗
5.
80
0
(0
.7
02
)
∗∗
∗
6.
29
2
(0
.7
74
)
∗∗
∗
1.
82
3
(0
.6
31
)
∗∗
∗
1.
63
2
(0
.2
99
)
∗∗
∗
R
2
0.
64
6
0.
69
5
0.
49
7
0.
38
9
0.
81
3
n.
a.
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
15
0
50
50
50
15
0
10
0
Fi
rs
t-
st
ag
e
F
-s
ta
t.
p-
va
lu
e
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
0.
81
3
Fi
rs
t-
st
ag
e
R
2
0.
64
1
0.
69
0
0.
66
4
0.
66
0
0.
66
0
0.
10
1
N
ot
e:
T
hi
s
ta
bl
e
re
po
rt
s
tw
o-
st
ag
e
le
as
t
sq
ua
re
s
es
ti
m
at
io
n
(2
sl
s)
:
po
ol
ed
2s
ls
fo
r
co
lu
m
ns
(i
)
to
(i
v)
;
la
gg
ed
de
pe
nd
en
t
2s
ls
fo
r
(v
);
fir
st
-d
if
fe
re
nc
ed
2s
ls
fo
r
(v
i)
.
T
he
de
pe
nd
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
is
th
e
lo
g
of
C
D
S
pr
ic
es
(i
n
ba
si
s
po
in
ts
,
ln
(S
ov
R
is
ki
t)
).
T
he
en
do
ge
no
us
re
gr
es
so
r
is
Ta
xB
as
e,
w
it
h
th
e
la
gg
ed
,
la
gg
ed
sq
ua
re
d
G
in
i
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
s,
an
d
la
gg
ed
C
or
ru
p-
ti
on
in
de
x
as
th
e
in
st
ru
m
en
ts
.
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
ar
e
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s
(s
.e
.a
fo
r
cl
us
te
re
d
by
co
un
tr
y
he
te
ro
sc
ed
as
ti
ci
ty
ro
bu
st
;
s.e
.b
fo
r
un
ad
ju
st
ed
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
r;
s.e
.c
fo
r
G
M
M
-
bo
ot
st
ra
p)
.
∗∗
∗
(∗
∗ ,
∗ )
de
no
te
st
at
is
ti
ca
l
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
at
1
(5
,1
0)
le
ve
l.
T
he
fir
st
-s
ta
ge
st
at
is
ti
cs
ar
e
fr
om
th
e
re
gr
es
si
on
of
Ta
xB
as
e
on
G
in
i,
G
in
i2
,
C
or
ru
pt
io
n
in
de
x,
an
d
al
l
ot
he
r
ex
og
en
ou
s
co
nt
ro
ls
in
th
e
So
vR
is
k
eq
ua
ti
on
.
Joshua Aizenman and Yothin Jinjarak8
Firstly, if E(Xit, ci) = 0 and cov(TaxBaseit, ci) = 0, then we could directly
apply a pooled two-stage least squares method to the panel data of 2007,
2009 and 2011 (3 data points) based on the specification above. Column (i)
applies the pooled two-stage least squares to the panel sample, 50 coun-
tries ∗ 3 years = 150 observations. The results of these pooled two-stage least
squares are consistent with the results of the time-specific estimation of
columns (ii) to (iv); respectively, years 2007, 2009, and 2011. For all specifi-
cations, the estimated effects of TaxBase and other macroeconomic controls
have the expected sign and are mostly statistically significant at 1 percent
level.
Column (v) applies the lagged-dependent two-stage least squares estima-
tion to the data, including the lagged CDS prices. This is like saying that
there is a persistency in sovereign risk; what makes CDS price in this period
high is the CDS price in periods ago. The results suggest that higher tax base
and lower public debt are associated with lower CDS prices. To check the
validity of Gini coefficient as the instrument for TaxBase, table 2 also reports
the first-stage F-statistics (equation (4)). For the regressions in column (v),
the p-value of the first-stage statistics is 0.000, so the Gini coefficients and
corruption level are not weak instruments for TaxBase. Because both regres-
sions are overidentified, the Sargan test for overidentifying restriction has
a p-value of 0.0143 for column (v), suggesting that the null hypothesis that
both the Gini, Gini2, and corruption instruments are exogenous cannot be
rejected at 1% significance level.
Alternatively, if E(Xit, ci) = 0 and cov(TaxBaseit, ci) = 0, we could han-
dle the fixed unobserved effects by constructing data on the changes in the
variables between year 2007 and year 2009, and between year 2009 and year
2011, and focusing on the medium-term period. Specifically, the change in
sovereign risk, SovRiski,2011 − SovRiski,2009, and SovRiski,2009 − SovRiski,2007,
are regressed against the change in tax base %GDP, TaxBasei,2011−
TaxBasei,2009, TaxBasei,2009 − TaxBasei,2007 and the change in macroeconomic
factors, xi,2011 − xi,2009, and xi,2009 − xi,2007 where each xi,t is the variable in Xit.
Three instruments are used: the change in the inequality over the period,
Ginii,2011 − Ginii,2009, the change in quadratic term of inequality over 5 years,
Gini2i,2010 − Gini2i,2005, and the change of corruption level. The results of this
before-and-after specification are in column (vi). The effect of the TaxBase
variable is now larger, positive, and insignificant. It is known that if the
lagged-dependent model (column (v)) is correct, but we use fixed effects as
in column (vi), estimates of TaxBase influence will tend to be too big.5
5 While the pooled 2sls in column (i) and the lagged-dependent 2sls in column (v) are not
straightforwardly comparable, a simple F test based on the same 150 observations sug-
gests that the estimation of (v) has significantly lower sum squared residuals (RSS) at the
5 percent level, consistent with its having a higher R2 (0.8 > 0.6). The first-differenced 2sls
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We summarize the economic significance of our econometric findings in
figure 2. For each variable, the corresponding bar in the figure is its coefficient
estimate of column (iv), multiplied by the sample standard deviation. Given
that the sample standard deviation of CDS prices is 1176.2 basis points in
2011, we find that our controls capture a significant variation in the sovereign
risk data. Our key factors of interest, the fiscal space variables (tax base and
public debt) – together account for more than 351.5 basis points of sovereign
risk as measured by the CDS prices, which is about a third of sovereign risk
in 2011. This estimate indicates that sovereign risk is responsive to the tax
base, and hence the Gini coefficient, though this association is estimated
using changes over the period, so it is a medium-run relationship. Other
macroeconomic variables, including growth, volatility, and inflation are also
economically large and significant in the sovereign risk equation. Overall,
the estimation suggests that increased inequality, and thus decreased tax
base and fiscal space, is associated with a significant worsening impact on
sovereign risk, at least in the medium run. Applying our estimates, with the
standard deviation of the tax base being 10.2 %GDP in 2011 (10.9% in 2007),
a one standard deviation increase of the Gini coefficient is associated with
a rise of 469 (= [21.4/10.2] ∗ 223.6)) basis points of the sovereign spread in
2011, and 723 basis points in 2007 (= [15.6/10.9] ∗ 504.9).
3. Concluding Remarks
This note identified the large negative effects of income inequality on the
tax base, and on the de-facto fiscal space. The de-facto fiscal space plays
a key role in accounting for sovereign spreads [Aizenman, Hutchison and
Jinjarak (2011)], and explains the patterns of fiscal stimuli in the aftermath
of the crisis [Aizenman and Jinjark (2011)]. The results suggest that more
polarized societies would find it harder to adjust to crises by raising taxes at
times of peril, as parties tend to be locked in a war of attrition, attempting
to minimize their adjustment burden. Thus, the de facto tax base is hard to
change overnight, as it reflects a social contract. This contract depends on
the tax enforcement capacities of a country, which are anchored in the pub-
lic’s perception of tax fairness and the gains from public sector expenditure,
factors that are hard to change at times of peril. This view is consistent with
recent empirical literature finding that tax compliance and the individual’s
willingness to pay taxes are affected by perceptions about the fairness of the
tax structure. An individual taxpayer is influenced strongly by his perception
in column (vi) is the worst performing estimation, due to the loss of variability in the data
as a result of first differencing (can also be seen from the low R2 in the first-stage estima-
tion).
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Figure 2
Economic Significance on Sovereign Risk, in Basis Points of CDS Prices
Note: This figure reports the economic significance of each variable based on the estima-
tion results of table 2, column (iv). The height of each bar is equal to the coefficient esti-
mate multiplied by the 2011 sample standard deviation of the variable.
of the behavior of other taxpayers [see Alm and Torgler (2006), and the ref-
erences therein]. If taxpayers perceive that their preferences are adequately
represented and they are supplied with public goods, their identification with
the state increases, and thus the willingness to pay taxes rises [Frey and Tor-
gler (2007)]. Thereby, greater income inequality limits the ability to conduct
a counter fiscal policy, and increases the downside risk of a given debt/GDP.
These results also suggest that the uniform fiscal guidelines of the Maas-
tricht treaty, recommending a public debt/GDP below 60%, were too lenient
for peripheral countries with a low tax base. The focus of the discussions on
the Euro crisis has been on the inequality between rich and poor member
states, and whether it has contributed to the crisis. Our analysis suggests that
another income inequality – within countries – could be responsible for the
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inability to conduct tax reforms. The Maastricht Criteria put too much em-
phasis on capping public debt/GDP below a threshold as a measure of fiscal
prudence, instead of encouraging countries with a low tax base to broaden
their tax base and adopt policies aiming at reducing income inequality. The
combination of the two would increase overtime the fairness perception of
the tax structure, reduce polarization, improve the adjustment capacity at
times of peril, and reduce the sovereign risk associated with a given public
debt/GDP. Accomplishing these tasks is challenging, yet the history of Brazil
during the last two decades illustrates vividly the feasibility of these reforms.6
4. Appendix
4.1. Data Sources
Gini Coefficients are based on the World Bank database: http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/INTRES/Resources/469232-1107449512766/AllTheGinis_
explanation.pdf. See also Milanovic et al. (2011) for further discussion on
the data and historical comparisons across countries.
Corruption Index ranges from −2.5 (low corruption) to +2.5, based on the
compilation of the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)
project.
Tax Base is calculated as the ratio of tax divided by GDP, averaged over the
period of previous five years to account for business cycle fluctuations. The
data are taken from the World Bank’s WDI, IMF Article IV Consultation
documents, OECD, and Eurostat.
Public Debt/GDP data are based on the IMF Fiscal Affairs Department,
Article IV Consultation documents, and World Economic Outlook.
Sovereign CDS prices are 5-year tenor and based on the CDS pricing is
based on London closing values collected from a consortium of over thirty
swap market participants. The data are taken from the CMA Datavision. See
6 The tax revenue in Brazil as a percent of the GDP rose from 25 percent to 37 percent
between 1993 and 2005. Intriguingly, Brazil’s GINI coefficient in 2001, 60, has decreased
to 54 in 2009. While Brazil remains challenged by inequality and fiscal deficiencies [see
Melo et al. (2010)], the reforms of the last two decades provide useful lessons for all
emerging markets, including Europe’s periphery countries. The record of the Euro Pe-
riphery has been mixed: the GINI coefficients of Greece was overall stable, 33 in 1999
and 32.9 in 2009, while its tax/GDP dropped from 35.4% in 1999 to 32.8% in 2009; for
Portugal, the GINI declined from 36 in 1999 to 33.7 in 2009, while its tax/GDP increased
from 33.4% in 1999 to 34.4% in 2009; for Spain, the GINI went from 32 in 1999 to 33.9
in 2009, while its tax/GDP dropped from 34.8% in 1999 to 31.6% in 2009; for Italy, the
GINI went from 29 in 1999 to 31.2 in 2009, while its tax/GDP increased from 42.4% in
1999 to 43.1% in 2009; for Ireland, the GINI went from 30 in 1999 to 33.2 in 2009, while
its tax/GDP dropped from 32.8% in 1999 to 29.8% in 2009.
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Aizenman et al. (2011) for further discussion on the CDS prices and related
studies.
Trade/GDP, Inflation (consumer price, %), Real GDP Growth and Volatil-
ity (three-year standard deviation), Real GDP/capita (in US$), and Foreign
Reserves/External debt are based on the data from WDI and the Economist
Intelligence Unit.
4.2. Country List (∗ Denotes OECD Countries)
ARGENTINA(ARG), AUSTRALIA(AUS∗), AUSTRIA(AUT∗), BEL-
GIUM(BEL∗), BULGARIA(BGR), BRAZIL(BRA), CHILE(CHL∗),
CHINA(CHN), COLOMBIA(COL), CZECH REPUBLIC(CZE∗), GER-
MANY(DEU∗), DENMARK(DNK∗), SPAIN(ESP∗), FRANCE(FRA∗),
GREECE(GRC∗), CROATIA(HRV), HUNGARY(HUN∗), INDONE-
SIA(IDN), IRELAND(IRL∗), ICELAND(ISL∗), ISRAEL(ISR∗),
ITALY(ITA∗), JAPAN(JPN∗), KAZAKHSTAN(KAZ), KOREA),
SOUTH(KOR∗), LEBANON(LBN), LITHUANIA(LTU), MOROC-
CO(MAR), MEXICO(MEX∗), MALAYSIA(MYS), NETHER-
LANDS(NLD∗), NORWAY(NOR∗), PANAMA(PAN), PERU(PER),
PHILIPPINES(PHL), POLAND(POL∗), PORTUGAL(PRT∗),
QATAR(QAT), ROMANIA(ROM), RUSSIA(RUS), SLOVAKIA(SVK∗),
SLOVENIA(SVN∗), SWEDEN(SWE∗), THAILAND(THA), TUNI-
SIA(TUN), TURKEY(TUR∗), UKRAINE(UKR), VENEZUELA(VEN),
VIETNAM(VNM), SOUTH AFRICA(ZAF)
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